Showing posts with label genetics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label genetics. Show all posts

Sunday, September 8, 2024

Imagining a World Without Mendel

Review of

Disputed Inheritance: The Battle over Mendel and the Future of Biology. By Gregory Radick. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2023. xii+ 630 pp. ISBN 978-0-226-82272-3 (paper).

How We Get Mendel Wrong, and Why It Matters. By Kostas Kampourakis. Boca Raton: CRC Press. 2024. xxi + 226 pp. ISBN 978-1-032-45690-4 (paper).



I am a reformed Mendelian. I left the cult when I came to realize that Mendel himself never had two laws called Segregation and Independent Assortment. That was Thomas Hunt Morgan’s reframing of Mendel. Prior to Morgan, the first decade-and-a-half of Mendelians referred to something nebulous and singular, Mendel’s Law. It generally went something like this: A trait is controlled by a pair of elements, only one of which is passed on to offspring, and one element of a pair can sometimes suppress the effect of the other.

But that leaves out chromosomes, polygenic inheritance, crossing-over, co-dominance, pleiotropy, epistasis, developmental plasticity, mtDNA, epigenetics, microbiomes, indeed most of genetics. Which in turn raises the question, are Mendel’s Laws the rule or the exception? The attempt to make Mendel seem relevant to an understanding of human genetics has indeed always proved vexing. There are genes making enzymes and blood antigens, but having B-negative blood or the ability to taste phenylthiocarbamide seem unlikely to have been major factors in the adaptive divergence of the hominin lineage, much less in the extinction of Neanderthals. Of course, there are also genes causing rare genetic diseases, but they are less relevant to a general understanding of human heredity simply by virtue of being rare. In 1940, infamously, the fruitfly geneticist Alfred Sturtevant suggested that the ability to roll one’s human tongue was a Mendelian trait.  By 1956, he acknowledged being embarrassed by it, but it proved too pedagogically valuable to discard so readily. The Mendelian gene, for all its heuristic value, is surprisingly elusive in human biology.

Gregory Radick is a historian of biology, whose excellent 2016 book on early studies of ape cognition, The Simian Tongue, is itself of considerable interest to readers of this journal. Radick wants to call our attention to W. F. R. (Raphael) Weldon, a geneticist at the base of the Mendelian intellectual tree, who maintained that the emerging concept of a gene was meaningless, for a gene (whatever it may be) is actually a complex and context-dependent unit. Weldon’s untimely death in 1906, argues Radick, left the more complex gene without a defender, and left subsequent Mendelian discourse on a much more simplistic (and conveniently easily politicized) track. That track was defined by William Bateson, who was so into Gregor Mendel that he named his first son (who later became an eminent anthropologist) after him.

Convergently, philosopher and biology educator Kostas Kampourakis has written several books on genetics and evolution, and trains his sights on Mendelism as well. As a historian, Radick is more focused on the past; Kampourakis, on the other hand, is more interested in the future. Both books are at pains to dismantle the myth of Mendel. The founding myth of genetics is that of the solitary genius, working to discover the basis of heredity in the cloistered confines of his monastery, disconnected from mainstream science; then deducing the rules of particulate genetic transmission by quantifying his results; and summarizing them in two Laws, Segregation and Independent Assortment (Dagher 2014).  He understood before anyone else that a genetic factor is responsible for a visible character, and it enters the next generation probabilistically. Alas, his work went unnoticed and thus unappreciated until 35 years later, when it was noticed, and belatedly constituted the foundation of our understanding of heredity – albeit with most of our understanding of heredity as exceptions. There have been, naturally, some geneticists who have pushed back in various ways against the reductive Mendelian fallacies at the center of 20th century genetics: notably, from center-left to far-left: Sewall Wright at Chicago, Conrad Waddington at Edinburgh, Richard Lewontin at Harvard, and Trofim D. Lysenko in Moscow.

Kampourakis highlights Mendel’s education and connectedness within the community of scholars, especially with Carl Nägeli, a Swiss experimental botanist. Mendel himself was interested in genetics only insofar as it related to hybridization, and he knew that his results were not particularly generalizable. Moreover, the 20th century was well underway before anyone at all was talking about two laws, Segregation and Independent Assortment. Kampourakis also paints with broader strokes than Radick, whose book is primary research in the history of science, with the depth and focus that comes with that territory. Both books are readable, and tell familiar and unfamiliar stories in readily understandable ways. Radick’s book is devoted in nearly its entirety to the machinations of William Bateson in promoting and elevating a particular vision of Mendel’s work.  Radick’s denouement is an experiment in counterfactual science history: What if Raphael Weldon hadn’t died in 1906, but had lived to challenge Bateson’s binary, essentialist “Mendelian gene” with a more fluid concept – a “Mendelian gene” that could be upregulated and downregulated, interact with other genes, and whose products could engage in a complex set of cellular, physiological, and ontogenetic processes, eventually resulting in a phenotype? 

Much has been written on just why Mendel’s work was ignored. It focused exclusively on heredity, when biologists still combined heredity and development, which later became disengaged after the development of the cell theory. It was also a paper about hybridization, not genetics. He didn’t follow it up. It was in German. And it was about peas. Today we casually accept (and teach) that reproduction in peas is the same as it is in humans, but that is actually only true from the perspective of cells. And even then, only very abstractly. Moreover, if you try to show your students videos of both species reproducing, you may well find the perspective of lawyers, in which reproduction in peas and people is very different, more important than the perspective of cells.

When I was in graduate school, some people followed an old rumor in questioning whether Brother Gregor fudged his data, on the grounds that his reported numbers were somehow too close to the ratios he was deducing. I always thought that was a weird argument; but to me what was weirder was that Mendel reported on seven traits, each of which turned out to be on a different one of the seven pea chromosomes. God must have really wanted him to come up with a Law of Independent Assortment.

Whatever laws he may have discovered, and whatever he may have done to discover them, the fact remains that Mendel was adopted as an icon by the fledgling field of genetics early in the 20th century. Students of heredity brandished him as their standard-bearer and mythic founder in much the same way as their recent precursors in natural history had adopted Darwin (Meloni 2016). Their main difference would be that Darwin’s insight was recognized in his time, while Mendel’s was not. A more sinister convergence is that both sets of theories were readily appropriated in ways that we identify retrospectively as evil: Social Darwinism (Hofstadter 1944) and social Mendelism (Teicher 2022).

We don’t talk as much about social Mendelism. But the tunnel vision of seeing the world from the perspective of cells and meiosis and fertilization eventually led Mendelism to accumulate a lot of baggage over the course of the 20th century. The gene for wrinkled seeds had hardly a fraction of the effect on people’s lives that the gene for feeblemindedness had. The Mendelian gene for beta-globin (dysfunctional in sickle-cell anemia) and the gene for hexosaminidase A (dysfunctional in Tay-Sachs Disease), which are both very real, lie on one side of the ledger.  On the other side are the genes for intelligence, altruism, and xenophobia, which aren’t real, or at least aren’t real in the same way.

A British geneticist named David Heron put it this way in 1912, critical of the American genetical obsession with a gene for this and a gene for that, especially when it came to psychological traits: “Mendel defectiveness seems for these American investigators to be a far more serious problem than mental defectiveness!” (p. 54, emphasis in original).

Obviously we don’t want to throw out the baby with the bathwater. So what is at stake with baby Gregor? On one side of the moral ledger are Mendel and his laws. On the other side of the ledger is the take-home lesson from the very first English textbook on the subject, called Mendelism: namely, that education is bunk, and “the creature is not made, but born” (Punnett 1905:60).  On that same side is the “unit-character fallacy,” identified by cautious geneticists a century ago as the problem of mapping a single gene onto a single noun – such as thalassophilia, an ostensibly genetic explanation for the Phoenicians’ love of the sea, by an incautious but nevertheless very influential geneticist. On that same side is also the idea that somehow you are, or are built from, nothing but the summation of your genes, the intellectual stimulus that eventually got the Human Genome Project rolling in the 1990s. And on that side as well is the idea that people can be naturally sorted into discrete binaries, like wrinkled and round peas.

So maybe taken as a whole, Mendelism wasn’t that great of a way to think about biological heredity in the first place, has run its course, and should be re-thought for the 21st century. Maybe binary Mendelian genes are simply special cases in a real world of chromosomes, RNA, pleiotropy, and epigenetics that sometimes even manages to mimic Lamarckism. Both books converge on a common theme: How can we teach human genetics differently and better? For a human genetics seminar, a science studies class, or just to rethink some of those undergraduate lectures, the two books will pair very well.

What might replace the Mendelian genes as units of inheritance? The physical elements that actually do the cellular work of segregating and recombining – namely, the chromosomes. There aren’t 20,000 independently segregating genetic elements in a human cell, only 23. The segregating units aren’t the genes, but blocks of genes. And within those segregating and recombining units lie units of transcription, embedded within complex patterns of DNA, whose products may themselves be biochemically active (i.e., as RNA), or may help produce other biochemically active molecules in turn (i.e, as proteins). The biochemical activity can be upregulated or downregulated by direct interaction with the environment (i.e., epigenetically) or by mutation. And out of this often qualitative cellular business somehow emerge quantitative phenotypes, for phenotypes are problematic, not automatic. And what gets downplayed in such a treatment? Those bits of phenotypic difference that automatically represent genotypic difference – that is to say, genes for things. Those rare diseases, like the pea examples, which are special cases.

Together, what these books demonstrate is that there is a major change in the offing about how we should teach the most basic facts about heredity, from centering abstract binary elements to instead centering the actual cellular and biological systems involved in genetic transmission. Viva la revolución!

 

References

Dagher, Zoubeida R. (2014) The relevance of history of biology to teaching and learning in the life sciences: The case of Mendel’s laws. Interchange 45: 205–216. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10780-015-9241-y.

Heron, David. (1913) Mendelism and the Problem of Mental Defect. I. A Criticism of Recent American Work. London: Dulau.

Hofstadter, Richard (1944) Social Darwinism in American Thought. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Meloni, Maurizio. (2016) Political Biology: Science and Social Values in Human Heredity from Eugenics to Epigenetics. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Punnett, Reginald C. (1905) Mendelism. London: Macmillan.

Sturtevant, A. H. (1940) A new inherited character in man. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA 26: 100-102.

Sturtevant, A. H. (1965) A History of Genetics. New York: Harper and Row.

Teicher, Amir (2020) Social Mendelism: Genetics and the Politics of Race in Germany, 1900–1948. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Friday, March 23, 2018

There's an arrogant anti-intellectual hereditarian at Harvard who isn't Steven Pinker! Who would have thunk it?


Harvard geneticist David Reich had an op-ed in the New York Times today that I find stimulating. As stupid genetics rants about human variation go, actually this one is better than many of them. Reich positions himself against Henry Harpending, James Watson, Nicholas Wade, and Hitler. So far, so good.

                But Reich, like many geneticists writing about race, does not really know what he is talking about. One of the major scientific accomplishments of the 20th century was to distinguish the study of race from the study of human variation. Reich works on the latter. But he writes about the former because (1) it’s more interesting; and (2) he doesn’t understand the difference.

                He argues against two groups of non-existent scholars: Those who believe everyone is the same, and those who believe genetics has no effect on cognition or behavior. He condescendingly refers to the first category of strawmen as “well-meaning people who deny the possibility of substantial biological differences among human populations.”

                Anthropologists have in fact been studying the differences among populations for a long time. At issue are its patterns. They are, in order: (1) cultural; (2) quantitative; (3) clinal;  and (4) local. If there were no differences among populations, we would not have been able to find that.

                The other category of strawman involves the denial of genetic “influences on behavior and cognition”.  Once again, nobody denies it; at issue are its patterns.  Time was, when geneticists were taught to distinguish between the causes of variation within groups and between groups. The old Harvard geneticist Richard Lewontin explained it back in the days of the racist psychologist Arthur Jensen and the racist physicist William Shockley. Suffice it to say that Reich’s examples are all within-group examples.  (They are also correlations, which he implies are causative.  Time was when geneticists were taught that distinction as well.)

This is why it is important, even urgent, that we develop a candid and scientifically up-to-date way of discussing any such differences, instead of sticking our heads in the sand and being caught unprepared when they are found.
Yes, indeed.  The problem is that apparently he has not read widely enough to encounter such a framework.

This is why knowledgeable scientists must speak out. If we abstain from laying out a rational framework for discussing differences among populations, we risk losing the trust of the public and we actively contribute to the distrust of expertise that is now so prevalent. We leave a vacuum that gets filled by pseudoscience, an outcome that is far worse than anything we could achieve by talking openly.
I generally don’t use the word pseudoscience, since it’s usually being propounded by scientists, and only visible in retrospect, like phrenology and eugenics.  Unfortunately the biggest boost that racial pseudoscience has traditionally gotten is the combination of arrogance and ignorance that geneticists have brought.  Remember Bruce Lahn, who identified the genes responsible for the backwardness of Africans in Science in 2005?  It’s not that, as Reich says, “discoveries could be misused to justify racism.” It’s that racism inheres in the research, because the people doing it have often been ignorant and myopic. They are technologists, not scholars; that is the danger.

                Reich fears, like Lahn, that the rest of us may be “anxious about any research into genetic differences among populations.”  Again, no, that’s not the problem at all. It’s that we don’t want racists studying human variation any more than we would want creationists studying bipedalism. We know that their intellectual prejudices corrupt their research.  It’s been going on for a long, long time.

     I can’t wait to read his new book on the racial invasions throughout prehistory.

     And so I guess this reinforces that the answer to the question I posed last year is still "yes".  It's a newer and more benign scientific racism - not the scientific racism of Harpending, Watson, and Wade - but whether it's ankle-deep or hip-deep, racist bullshit is still racist bullshit.




Thursday, June 5, 2014

Nazis love Nicholas Wade. Shouldn’t that be a problem for him?


          The nutters at The American Renaissance are promoting A Troublesome Inheritance like mad.  Likewise at The Occidental ObserverAccording to the Southern Poverty Law Center,

Wade’s book has been publicly endorsed by former KKK Grand Wizard David Duke, championed by noted white supremacists like Jared Taylor, John Derbyshire, and Steve Sailer, and tirelessly promoted on the neo-Nazi forum Stormfront .... For all of Wade’s supposed concerns about the politicization of science, his book is entirely a phenomenon of the racist, far-right fringe.

          I wonder whether Nicholas Wade comes home and says, "My book is a best-seller, and the Nazis love me. Life is good.".  

          Of course that’s not an argument against the book.  That’s just data about who likes the book very much.  Now let’s recap Wade's arguments (slightly modified from my last post).

  • Modern scientific views about human variation are politically correct myths produced by Marxist anthropologists, who are stifling serious discussion of human variation.
  • The human species really does come naturally divisible into a fairly small number of fairly discrete kinds of people, or “races”. Human groups are fundamentally products of biological history.
  • These groups have genetic distinctions that cause personality distinctions. These include “genetic adaptations” of the Chinese to obedience, Jews to capitalism, and Africans to violence.
  • Economic strata and nations are also fundamentally biological entities, with their own natural proclivities.
  • Global geo-political history can be understood and explained by its significant genetic component.


          In Wade’s own words, he is exploring “the possibility that human behavior has a genetic basis that varies from one race to another”; “trust has a genetic basis”; and “national disparities in wealth arise from differences in intelligence”.  Wade’s scholarship is poor, his arguments are spurious, his science is cherry-picked and  misrepresented, he dismisses the real science, and the ideas he promotes are racist fictions.   

          Context is important for understanding Wade's new book.  Some of what follows is derived from my essays in In These Times and The Huffington Post.  A lot isn't.  

I

               Perhaps the most important discovery of early anthropology was that social inequality was inherited, but not in the same way that natural features were.   You pass on your complexion to your children and you pass on your social status to your children, but you do so by very different modes.    The first would eventually come to be called “genetics” and the second, “culture” – and their relationship is that, although they are often correlated, the microevolutionary processes of genetics and the historical processes of culture are phenomenologically distinct.

               The birth pangs of this discovery occurred in the mid-19th century, in the works of the near-contemporaries Arthur de Gobineau and Karl Marx.  Marx, of course, recognized the fact that human misery was the result of political economy and wrote an influential critique of it.  Gobineau’s work was easier to understand, because he posited that civilization was the result of biology.  There were better and worser peoples, and in the ten places he thought that civilization arose, it was brought by the better peoples (“Aryans”), who eventually interbred with the local yokels, thus bringing forth a decline of said civilization.

               Gobineau’s idiotic theory impressed few scholars, even in an age where civilization and race had not yet been well problematized.  It was seen as a transparent attempt to rationalize the existence of the hereditary aristocracy in an age when all manner of traditional class distinctions were breaking down, and people of humble origins were becoming wealthy and powerful, and republican institutions were supplanting monarchial ones.  The early physical anthropologist (and polygenist, pro-slavery physician) Josiah Nott had it translated into English in 1856, but it wasn’t widely read, being mooted by the Civil War.  A second English edition in the UK, during World War I, did a bit better, until it too was mooted by politics, this time by World War II.   You can get it online, by the way, thanks to “The Christian Identity Forum”.  (Whoever they are, the folks at the Christian Apologetics and Research Ministries don’t want to have anything to do with them, and identify the Christian Identity movement as “centered on a racist/anti-Semitic and white supremacy”.)  

          In 1969, the right-wing plant geneticist Cyril Darlington published a genetic history of the human species , called The Evolution of Man and Society.  The trick, of course, is that you know a little bit of the history, but you just get to make up the racial and class genetics.  So ancient Greece gets a make-believe genetic treatment, in terms of Aryan invaders subjugating local peoples and admixing with them.    

It was something created and maintained by a stratified society, a society built up by the working together of many peoples, Minoan merchants, Mycenean scribes, Egyptian masons and artists, Aegean sailors, Phoenician boat builders and also priests, each caste except the slaves preserving its own genetic independence, and hence its own separate traditions, while learning, some readily, some reluctantly, to speak the common Semitic language on which the society depended for its well-being.  (p. 155)
Later, non-Aryan 

[i]nvaders from the northern Balkans burst into the Mediterranean world.  They penetrated Anatolia…. Later under the name of Dorians they invaded the centre and south of Greece….. [T] he same invaders attacked the Egyptians who threw them back.  But they were able as Philistines to settle in and give their name to Palestine; and to set up colonies in Crete, Libya, Sicily, and Italy.  These maritime achievements, could not, however, have been the work of the inland Aryans who knew nothing of the sea.  Rather they represent the fragments of Anatolian and Balkan peoples already subjugated by Aryan invaders. (p. 155).  
Each city arose from the fusion of several racial stocks speaking their own dialects and worshipping their own gods. (p. 157).
Obviously people moved around sometimes, but the idea that they remained genetically stable, much less had particular aptitudes that determined their place in a stable, rigid genetic caste system is at best non-empirical, and at worst racist bullshit.  

The Homeric society… was ruled by kings who were advised by nobles (or men with ancestors) and applauded by ordinary freemen.  This limitation of arbitrary government by custom was derived from the racial character and social structure of the Aryan invader of Greece.  It distinguished them from most of the ancient peoples who however provided the genetic elements…. (p. 163)

And to cap it off, “The result of these developments was to make the Spartan aristocracy a pure race.”  To which Darlington appended a clarifying footnote  “We are often told by popular writers that there are no examples of pure  races of men.  We shall be noting many examples and observing the predictable similarity in their history” (p. 165). 

          Darlington’s work had its predecessors, like Hans  F. K. Gunther’s  Rassenkunde Europas, which was translated by Nazi assholes in 1927 as The Racial Elements of European History and has been digitized by modern Nazi assholes and is available here.

          And Darlington’s work has its successors as well. In particular, a newish dopey genetic history of the human species, called The 10,000 Year Explosion, by a physicist, Gregory Cochran, and an anthropologist, Henry Harpending. The theme is pretty much the same as Darlington’s: The authors know a bit of genetics, and they’re going make that about 10% of the story they want to tell, and creatively imagine the other 90%, but not take too much trouble to distinguish them for readers. Cochran and Harpending begin with the proposition that the human gene pools have been tweaked by things like malaria resistance and lactase persistence over the last 10,000 years, from which they conclude that many aspects of our gene pool have been tweaked as well over much shorter spans of time, for psychological traits, resulting in the major outlines of history, such as the agricultural revolution, scientific revolution, and industrial revolution.

          There are differences between The Evolution of Man and Society and The 10,000 Year Revolution, to be sure. Darlington’s work was over 750 pages of small font, erudite, tightly-spaced bullshit, while The 10,000 Year Explosion is 288 pages of ignorant, widely-spaced bullshit. Where Darlington’s bullshit about the ancient Greeks ran to scores of pages of make-believe genetics, Cochran and Harpending dispense with them in just a couple of paragraphs, noting that the ancient Greeks had colonies and that their gene pools fought off malaria. Of rather more interest to them are the Etruscans, “a somewhat mysterious people who spoke a non-Indo-European language that we have not yet deciphered.” But undeterred by such agnotological issues, they explain that the “Etruscans added a healthy dose of Middle eastern, agriculture-shaped alleles into the Roman mix. We have reason to suspect that those alleles shaped attitudes as well as affecting metabolism and disease resistance” (p. 144).

          Not surprisingly, also unconstrained by relevant data, Darlington blows a bigger bag of genetic gas about the Etruscans. According to Darlington, they had a “genetic particularism [which caused] a lack of political unity” and connected them with Hittite ancestors, thus demonstrating that “the genetic continuity overrides the cultural discontinuity” (p. 238).

          And there are similarities too. Darlington is very interested in the Jews. He devotes two chapters to them, and “Jews” is the longest entry in his copious index. But although he is obviously a bit too creepily interested in them, he remarks only in passing that some of them have been smart, and at least stops short of geneticizing that. The first on board that ship was actually C. P. Snow – of “The Two Cultures”, according to a New York Times article in 1969.  Unsurprisingly, it generated a bit of correspondence.

          And that’s really what The 10,000 Year Explosion is really all about – asserting that the idosyncracies of the Ashkenazi Jewish gene pool, which most geneticists today attribute to genetic drift, is really due to natural selection for intelligence. In the same way that some populations are genetically shielded from the worst aspects of malaria, the Ashkenazi Jews are shielded from the worst aspects of stupidity. And although the Cochran-Harpending book is not cited in Nicholas Wade’s brand-new book, A Troublesome Inheritance, their other work is, and his arguments are heavily derivative upon theirs.

II

               Nicholas Wade is one of the premier science journalists in America, and an avid promoter of molecular genetics, particularly as applied to anthropological questions.    But his professional idiosyncrasies are well known; the Anthropology News did a story on him in 2007, and he told them, “Anyone who’s interested in cultural anthropology should escape as quickly as they can from their cultural anthropology department and go and learn some genetics, which will be the foundation of cultural anthropology in the future.”  A discussion of his new book about genetics and anthropology, then, should probably begin with a recollection of his last book on the subject, Before the Dawn (2007).

               It was reviewed in the journal Science by Rebecca Cann, who did not exactly gush.  

As a graduate student, I was amazed by the number of books popularizing human paleontology that ignored human genetics, and I often wished that there were science writers energized to follow the new insights from geneticists as closely and rapidly as others reported interpretations of fragmentary fossils. Well, be careful what you wish for.  

It was also reviewed in Nature, where he was deemed to be “in step with a long march of social darwinists”.    And to gauge from the new book, he still is.

               The theme of A Troublesome Inheritance is an unusual one for a science journalist, namely that the scientists themselves are all wrong about the things that they are experts in, and it will take a naïf like the author, unprejudiced by experience,  judgment, or actual knowledge, to straighten them out.  If this sounds like a template for a debate with a creationist, well, yes, I suppose it does.  That is because the nature of the intellectual terrain – the authoritative story of where we came from and who we are – lies on the contested turf of human kinship, and everybody thinks they own a piece of it.

               Wade’s ambition, then, is not to popularize the science, but to invalidate the science. He explains that anthropologists, who have been studying human variation for a while, and who think they have learned something about it, have actually been blinded by their prejudices – politically-correct prejudices, that is.  And his message to them egghead perfessers is that he believes the science of 250 years ago was better than that of today:  There are just a few basic kinds of people, and economic stratification is just an expression of an underlying genetic stratification.

Lest you think the author is an exponent of racism or social Darwinism, he is quick to tell you that he isn’t.  He’s read a book or two on each of those subjects.  He doesn’t think he is a racist because a racist believes that natural groups of people are universally or transcendently rankable, whereas he only believes they are rankable intellectually.  And he doesn’t think he is a social Darwinist because that was an ideologically-driven “perversion of science” to be laid at the feet of Herbert Spencer, and he is quite certain that he is not an ideologue.  He is simply exploring a few propositions, such as: “the possibility that human behavior has a genetic basis that varies from one race to another”; “trust has a genetic basis”; and “national disparities in wealth arise from differences in intelligence”.  Eventually he even comes around to “the adaptation of the Jews to capitalism.”  And lest you think that he is using the term adaptation in the broad sense of “fit to the environment” he explains that he only uses the term in the narrow sense of tweaking the gene pool - “a genetically based evolutionary response to circumstances”.

               The punch line of the book, however, is not really about anthropology at all, but about history.  Towards the end of the book, Wade finally confronts his bête-noire, the biologist Jared Diamond, whose 1997 best-seller, Guns, Germs, and Steel, took a self-consciously anti-racist approach to the subject of human history, and concluded that the answers to the big questions about how the modern  social-political-economic world came to be as it is lie in the domains of geology and ecology.  Wade rejects this, because he believes the answers lie in the domain of genetics.   Actually, though, they’re both wrong, for the answers to those questions lie in the domain of history. 

               Guns, Germs and Steel was admired by biologists, but generally ignored by historians.  Why?  Because it wasn’t a very modern approach to history.  If history is reducible to nature (ecology and geography in one case, genetics in the other), then history doesn’t really happen.  You just wait long enough, and eventually it merely unfolds.  Why? Because the explanations for things lie outside of the relations among the things themselves, but lie instead in nature.  The historian William McNeill pointed that out in his review of Diamond in the New York Review of Books,  judging that book to be “a clever caricature rather than a serious effort to understand what happened across the centuries and millennia of world history.”  And finally, McNeill lowered the boom on Diamond’s politically correct, biologized history:  “I conclude that Diamond … has never condescended to become seriously engaged with the repeated surprises of world history, unfolding lifetime after lifetime and turning, every so often, upon single, deliberate acts.”  When Diamond objected that his book was profound and scientific, McNeill reiterated, arguing that historians have “more respect for natural history than Diamond has for the conscious level of human history. He wants simple answers to processes far more complex than he has patience to investigate.”

               For the most part, though, historians were dazzled by Diamond’s erudition, relieved that he wasn’t a racist, impressed by the story he told, and they treated the book politely and deferentially.  And A Troublesome Inheritance is the racist chicken that has come home to roost.  Wade explicitly opposes his book to Diamond’s, and attempts to explain the big picture of human history not in terms of the shapes of the continents, but in terms of the innate qualities of the people inhabiting the continents.   History is not history, you see, it is genetics.

               At the heart of A Troublesome Inheritance is a simple dissimulation.   Wade repeatedly asserts that his interlocutors are mixing their politics with their science, but he isn’t, for he is just promoting value-neutral, ideology-free science.  And yet the primary sources for Wade’s discussion of the history of human society are Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington.  One gets the impression that either Wade is lying, or he wouldn’t be able to recognize ideology if looked him dead in the eye and slapped him silly.

III

               Before advancing his thesis, Wade prepares the way, explaining that – unlike what anthropologists have concluded – first, race is biologically real; second, the course of human history is biology; and third, this is all ideologically neutral.

               The problem, he believes, lies with the anthropologists, who have been ideologically corrupted, sometimes by their Marxism, sometimes by their desire to be politically correct, sometimes by their persecuted Jewish origins.  There is no indication that Wade realizes it, but this argument was originally put forward by a segregationist activist in the early 1960s named Carleton Putnam.  It was bullshit then, and it’s bullshit now.  Moreover, it was political then, and it’s political now.  In fact you can download it from the friendly folks at the Christian Identity Forum for free, or buy a copy for just $12.95 from Nicholas Wade’s supporters at the American Renaissance.   

          But that raises the question:  When Wade makes the argument that the topic is so political that anthropological science has been ideologically corrupted by anthropological politics, how do we know that Wade’s vision is not also political?  If you have already acknowledged that you are on political terrain, we should have some evidence that your own science is less politicized, especially when your views are so convergent with those of certain political extremists.  And when you consider that the most genetically knowledgeable reviewers of Wade’s work have found remarkably little value in his ideas about the subject, it does seem that Wade is rather more politicized than the anthropologists, not less.

               But this raises the odd question of just how a science journalist can position himself so self-consciously against the science he reports on.  Imagine a journalist writing a book claiming that chemists are all wrong about chemistry.   Would such a lunatic even find a publisher?    But anthropology  is a special science, and he does find a publisher.  Why?  Because, contrary to his own misbegotten contention, it is indeed political; it’s politics all the way down.  That doesn’t mean that there is no knowledge, of course, only that we have to be extra careful in evaluating the diverse kinds of data and conclusions, because there are more variables at work.

               Wade quickly notes that IQs differ geographically, and doesn’t question the assumption that this is a precise measure of small differences in innate brain power, but does reassure his readers that “a higher IQ score doesn’t make East Asians morally superior to other races.”  But moral ranking isn’t the issue; intellectual ranking is at issue.  And if you believe, as Wade does, that Africans have less of this innate brain power, on the average, than Europeans do – which implies that a randomly chosen African is likely to be constitutionally dumber than a randomly chosen European - well, that made you a racist in 1962, and that makes you a racist now.

               Wade lays out his ideas about race in Chapter 5, as a rhetorical exercise in selective and mis-reporting.  His centerpiece is a 2002 paper, published in Science by a group led by Stanford geneticist Marcus Feldman, which used a computer program called Structure to cluster populations of the world by their DNA similarities.  When they asked the computer to cluster peoples of the world into two groups, the computer gave them EurAfrica and Asia-Oceania-America.  When they asked the computer for three groups, the computer gave them Europe, Africa, and Asia-Oceania-America.  When they asked the computer for four groups, it gave them Europe, Africa, Asia-Oceania, and America.   When they asked it for five groups, it gave them essentially the continents.  And when it asked the computer for six, it gave them the continents and the Kalash people of Pakistan.  (They asked the computer for many more clusters, but only published the results up to six.)

               Wade misreported these results as validating the five races in The New York Times back in 2002.  In an important edited volume from 2008 called Revisiting Race In a Genomic Age, Deborah Bolnick explained the misinterpretation of the results from Structure, and the senior author of that study, Marcus Feldman, also explained those results quite differently than Wade does.  In fact, I’ve heard Feldman say that Wade has totally misrepresented his work and misquoted him.  Why, then, does Wade persist in this genetic misreporting?  Perhaps for the same reason he persists in his anthropological misreporting.  In Chapter 6, Wade casually explains that among “the Yanomamo of Venezuela and Brazil, aggressive men are valued as defenders in the incessant warfare between villages, and those who have killed in battle – the unokais – have on the average  2.5 more children than men who have not killed, according to the anthropologist Napoleon Chagnon,” citing Chagnon’s 1988 paper that indeed made that claim.  And yet, although that claim has been definitively shown to be bunk – that is to say, not robustly derivable from the data – Wade continues to repeat it, most recently in The New York Times last year.   There is, again, a direct parallel to arguing with creationists here: they have their story and they will stick to it, and reality  just doesn’t matter to them.   (And just between you and me, I’d be very interested to find out what Napoleon Chagnon thinks of this book!)

IV

“History is bunk” said Henry Ford, and Wade is not too keen to worry about getting his history right, either.  He presents the reader with Linnaeus’s 1735 classification of humans into species, rather than his 1758 classification of humans into subspecies (which is more important, since that is the work with which biological systematics officially begins).  He also says that “Linnaeus did not perceive a hierarchy of races,” although that is hard to reconcile with Linnaeus's terse descriptions of Europeans, Asians, Americans, and Africans for either covering (wears tight-fitting clothes, wears loose-fitting clothes, paints himself with fine red lines, anoints himself with grease) or governance (law, custom, opinion, caprice).  Sounds pretty hierarchical to me.

Moreover, says Wade, the 18th century American craniologist Samuel George Morton “did not in fact believe … that intelligence was correlated with brain size.”  Nevertheless Morton does characterize “The Caucasian Race” in Crania Americana (1839) as follows: “The skull is large and oval…. This race is endowed for the facility with which it attains the highest intellectual endowments.”  And for “The American Race,”  Morton records, “The skull is small…. In their mental character the Americans are averse to cultivation, and slow in acquiring knowledge….”  Sure sounds like he thought they were correlated.

Wade’s admiration for Morton seems to be based in large part on his uncritical reading of a bizarre 2011 article that made some unfounded claims against the late evolutionary biologist Stephen Jay Gould.   Wade actually quotes approvingly an especially false statement from that paper, “Morton, in the hands of Stephen Jay Gould, has served for 30 years as a textbook example of scientific misconduct.”   But that statement is doubly false: Morton’s work is not at all presented as a paradigmatic example of misconduct, and indeed, even Gould explicitly said it was unconscious bias, not scientific misconduct.  The paper quoted by Wade had bogus citations in support of that statement:  a book of mine that did not cite Morton at all on the subject of scientific misconduct, and a book by C. Loring Brace that explicitly cited it as not scientific misconduct.   I’ll let Gould speak for himself here:  “Yet through all this juggling, I detect no sign of fraud or conscious manipulation.”  [S. J. Gould, The Mismeasure of Man, 1981: 69].

When Wade gets around to Darwin, he makes some impressive misstatements as well.  Darwin of course wrote The Origin of Species in 1859 and avoided the topic of people (which is probably why the book is still readable today).  But Wade keeps on:  “Humans were covered in his second volume, The Descent of Man, which appeared 12 years later.”  It’s hard to imagine The Descent of Man being Darwin’s “second volume” of anything, since he published two books (On the Various Contrivances by which British and Foreign Orchids are Fertilised by Insects and The Variation of Animals and Plants Under Domestication) in between them.   And frankly, The Descent of Man was two volumes by itself. 

Wade’s treatment of social Darwinists is surprisingly cursory, given that he had been accused of being one of them in the pages of the leading science journal in the world.  Historians today appreciate that only in hindsight was social Darwinism monolithic and nameable, and it was significantly different from eugenics, at very least because the social Darwinists wanted less government interference, and the eugenicists wanted more.  The movements are united by the fact that they both assumed that the (visible) social hierarchy was an expression of an underlying (invisible) natural hierarchy; the “haves” were simply constitutionally better suited to “having” than were the “have-nots”.  As will become clear, Wade really does fall in with them.

Perhaps the most unhistorical aspect of Wade’s racial theory, presented at the end of Chapter 4, is that he seems to be oblivious to its origins and antecedents.   Wade claims to speak on behalf of Darwinism to legitimize his ideas, like many of the discarded ideologies he discusses early in the book.  But when he tells us that there are three great races associated with the continents of the Old World, and intermediate hybrid races at their zones of overlap, he is merely repackaging the pre-Darwinian Biblical myth of Ham, Shem and Japheth, the sons of Noah, who went forth, became fruitful, and multiplied.   The people Wade thinks are the least pure live precisely where the oldest fossil representatives of our species are known – East Africa and West Asia.  The idea that the human populations of Lagos, Oslo, and Seoul are primordial and pure is wrong (and creationist); those are simply the furthest, most extreme, and most different from one another. 

On p. 58, Wade names his adversaries for the first time: “Marxist academics”.   On p. 68, he goes after Ashley Montagu, attributing his anti-racist writings significantly to his Jewish origins.  (And for what it’s worth, Montagu fit nobody’s definition of a Marxist.)  On p. 119, Wade tells us that Montagu’s book, Man’s Most Dangerous Myth, relied heavily on Richard Lewontin’s 1972 genetic work.  Perhaps the edition Wade skimmed indeed cited Lewontin’s work, but the first edition of Man’s Most Dangerous Myth was published in 1942, so I suspect that it was based on other data and arguments.  For a book about the engagement of race and genetics, it’s kind of odd that Wade seems to be oblivious to all work in the area prior to Lewontin’s.  And for a book that takes race as its central subject, it’s kind of odd that Wade doesn’t seem to be familiar with the source of Montagu’s campaign against the word “race” – which was derived from We Europeans, the 1935 book by the British biologist Julian Huxley and anthropologist Alfred Cort Haddon.   Neither of them was Jewish, and not much in the way of Marxists, either.

V

It is when Wade ventures into evolutionary waters that his scholarly weaknesses become most evident.  His presentation of the evolutionary theory is reductive and freshman-level; it is hard to find a book on evolution today that fails to mention epigenetics, but this is one such book.  But to acknowledge the plasticity or adaptability of the human organism would be to undermine the theme of the independent, unforgiving external world exacting its selective toll on the human gene pool.  Flexibility and reactivity are not in Wade’s evolutionary arsenal – he constructs evolution as gene pools adapting to given external circumstances.  That is only a few decades out of date.

Similarly, he explains that “The words adapt and adaptation are always used here in the biological sense of a genetically based evolutionary response to circumstances” (p. 58).   Sure, except that that defines most adaptation (which really refers to the fit between an organism and its surroundings, of which a small subset is actually genetic) out of existence.

Evolutionary biology perhaps takes its biggest beating when Wade breezily tells us about ants.  “In the case of ants, evolution has generated their many different kinds of society by keeping the ant body much the same and altering principally the behavior of each society’s members.  People too live in many different types of society, and evolution seems to have constructed these with the same strategy – keep the human body much the same but change the social behavior.”  Of course he is comparing one species of humans with over 20,000 species of ants – that is to say, an orchard of apples with an orange.   By the next page (66), Wade actually appreciates the idiocy of the comparison, and concedes, “With human societies, institutions are largely cultural and based on a much smaller genetic component.” 

Wade also places a lot of emphasis on “in-groups” and “out-groups,” repeatedly asserting that we have an innate desire to support the ins, and to distrust, despise, or harm the outs.   Some data on domestic violence might disabuse naive readers about the validity of such a facile generalization.  So might some data on the flexibility of group membership, not to mention the constructed nature of the groups themselves.  Here’s a glib thought from p. 50: “...an inbuilt sense of morality evolved, one that gave people an instinctive aversion to murder and other crimes, at least against members of their own group.”   If you think there’s an instinctive aversion to “murder and other crimes,” you need to watch “The Godfather” again.   (Sure, that was fiction, but then so is A Troublesome Inheritance, although less honestly labeled.)  If you try to weasel through with the phrase “your own group” then you need to think about the formlessness, situation-dependence, and segmentary nature of the “group” – What is Michael Corleone’s group? The Corleone family, the New York mob, Sicilian-Americans, urban immigrants, Americans, or Earthlings?  Group membership is actually quite flexible and, as we now say, constructed.  And there certainly doesn’t appear to be any inborn aversion to lying, embezzling, insider trading, fraud,  graft, or usury – so on what basis can we reliably assert anything inborn about other particular crimes?

On p. 49, we learn that “The urge to punish deviants from social norms is a distinctive feature of human societies.”    Except that societies don’t have urges, of course.  And the people who compose societies can rationalize, or get away with, all kinds of things. It is not merely that human social life involves rule-governed behavior; it is that rules are also there to be bent and circumvented, so that people can be both obedient and pragmatic simultaneously—which is why more thoughtful and knowledgeable writers don’t go quite so easily from the punishment of deviants to the invention of a simple genetic/mental module for it.   Moreover, if you remember first-wave sociobiology from the 1980s, one of the things the sociobiologists used to say was that there could be no group selection in humans since it requires coercive mechanisms in order to be a stable evolutionary strategy.   Apparently those coercive mechanisms were there after all, and those sociobiologists were all wet.  (As an ironic aside, first-wave sociobiology also cast itself consciously against anthropology, and Wade’s only blurb on the jacket for this awful book comes from E. O. Wilson, himself.)

Perhaps the most appalling feature of all is that Wade hasn’t even got the guts to own his thoughts, sprinkling the prose with disclaimers like, “Given the vast power of culture to shape human social behavior....”  Or, “a society’s achievements … are largely cultural in essence.”  And, “culture is a mighty force, and people are not slaves to innate propensities.” If the influence of culture has been so mighty and vast, then it stands to reason that that is what you should be reading books about; not this one.  At best, Wade’s labor has effectively been to fabricate a small tail to wag a mighty big dog.

Wade’s neuroendocrinology is just as bad.   His representations of hormones and their actions and regulation are what one would expect to see in Cosmopolitan: oxytocin is the hormone of social trust: monoamine oxidase is an aggression gene.  Wade clearly wants readers to believe that their activities are set by natural selection, in spite of disclaimers like  “It is not yet by what specific mechanism the oxytocin levels in people are controlled” (p. 53).  And he has no reluctance to invoke science fiction where there is no science: after explaining to readers that he thinks African-Americans have a higher frequency of a violence gene, he mollifies them with the thought that other violence genes (that he hasn’t invented yet)  may be higher in whites.  “It is therefore impossible,” he intones, to say on genetic grounds that one race is genetically more prone to violence than another.”  But in the very next paragraph,  he clarifies, "that important aspects of human social behavior are shaped by the genes and that these behavior traits are likely to vary from one race to another”.

It does seem to me that the focus on the ontology of race is a red herring in this book.  Wade relies a lot more on other inaccurate invocations of genetics that are even more radical, and more importantly, political.  He overstates the isolation of prehistoric populations.  More importantly, what scholars think are changes in ways of life, Wade thinks are changes in genes and brains that lead to changes in ways of life.  Thus,  “a deep genetic change in social behavior underlay …. the transition from an agrarian to a modern society.... Most likely a shift in social behavior was required, a genetic change that reduced the level of aggressivity common in hunter-gatherer groups.”

And for all his rhetorical interest in races as natural categories, somehow the only group that merits their own chapter are ... the Jews!  The Jews seem to be central to the book’s meta-narrative, as one very sympathetic blogger on "White Identity, Interests, and Culture" explained: "I can’t think of any prominent race denial figures who are not Jewish. The backbone of the race denial movement was a specific radical Jewish subculture that had become entirely within the mainstream of the American Jewish community by the early twentieth century.... There is excellent evidence for their strong Jewish identifications, their concern with specific Jewish issues such as anti-Semitism, and for their hostility and sense of moral and intellectual superiority toward the traditional people and culture of America. Jonathan Marks is a contemporary example of this long and dishonorable tradition. The rise of the left to elite status in American society, beginning with universities, is key to understanding the race denial movement and the stifling political correctness that is all around us today."

Why is Wade so interested in the Jews, anyway?  His staunchest defenders sure are, too.  But the nature of their interest is highly anachronistic.  (Actually the Jews are of some legitimate scholarly interest today in what we might call “the anthropology of genetics” – for example, in the recent excellent work of anthropologist Nadia Abu el-Haj, and historian Veronika Lipphardt.)

And finally, his view of the origin of the industrial revolution in England involves mutations in the upper economic classes for “nonviolence, literacy, thrift and patience” and their diffusion by gene flow into the lower classes in Late Medieval times.   This is a slightly new spin on a set of old prejudices, but hardly science, much less modern or value-free science.  Wade doubles down on this a few pages later, too: “The burden of proof is surely shifted to those who might wish to assert that the English population was miraculously exempt from the very forces of natural selection whose existence it had suggested to Darwin.”

Afraid not.  The burden of proof still lies with the disseminator of outmoded, racist ideologies masquerading as science.  Wade simply believes he can construct his own reality by selective reading, misrepresentation, and continuous repetition.  This is a golem of science journalism, a powerful monster running amok under its own impetus, burdened by neither responsibility nor wisdom. 

We write books for a reason. So, given the abysmal quality of the scholarship, misrepresentation and dismissal of the relevant science, and the embrace by the most reprehensible elements in modern politics, what do you suppose was Nicholas Wade's motivation for writing A Troublesome Inheritance?   Does he really believe his own lies, or is he merely pandering?



Monday, August 19, 2013

The Empire Strikes Back

Some of you older folks may remember the case in which geneticist Therese Markow (then of Arizona State, now of UC-San Diego) bled a Native American tribe on the promise of studying diabetes, and then piggybacked some research on schizophrenia and population structure and history onto that promise; except that she didn't tell them about it and they didn't consent to it.  This had been "situation normal" in the field for decades, but in the wake of the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA, born 1990) and the Human Genome Diversity Project (HGDP, died 1996), it is no longer acceptable practice.

The Havasupai case helped to reframe the relationship between scientists and Native peoples, which had been tested by the HGDP, and which had relied for decades on the assumption that there was a gentleman's agreement between the geneticist and the tribe, and that the geneticist could say anything to get the genetic samples from the tribe, and after it was out of their bodies, it was the property of the scientist, who could then do pretty much anything with it, including research that the tribe had not agreed to, and trading samples to other labs for other research.  But no more.  

In April 2010, the lawsuit brought by the Havasupai against Markow's institution was settled out of court, and the tribe, the university, and the bioethics community were all satisfied with the results.  I wrote it up for Anthropology Today shortly afterwards.

Now that we have blown up the Death Star, however, the Empire is striking back.  Ricki Lewis, the author of a major textbook on human genetics, and thus with the potential to miseducate thousands of students in human genetics, now says that Teri Markow did not actually study schizophrenia, the investigation and report commissioned on behalf of ASU and the Havasupai was a smear job, and the charges against her were entirely false.

So we are compelled to revisit the case once more.  Think of Teri Markow as Alex Rodriguez, and yourself as Bud Selig.

Ricki Lewis carried out a literature search and discovered that Teri Markow never published on the genetics of Havasupai schizophrenia.  From this, she concludes that Markow never actually studied it.

Like the weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, the narrative that the geneticist sought schizophrenia genes in Havasupai DNA became established fact with the repeating. Soon the accounts of the case began quoting and citing each other, as if the original documents that held the truth didn’t even exist.

The trail of original documents is actually rather interesting.  The most significant document is the one produced by Arizona State's investigation at the end of 2003, known as the Hart Report.  Ricki Lewis dismisses it, because she has additional secret information:   

I’ve got more background than went into the blog, and based on it, I wouldn’t trust the Hart report.

Be that as it may, the Hart report was based on extensive interviews and paper trails, and was as comprehensive as could be expected, to the satisfaction of both the Havasupai and the university.  It discusses lots of other original documents, such as consent forms.  In fact, it tells us that in an interview with Markow in 2003, "Markow had indicated, during the course of the interview, that she had lost or misplaced the file containing the informed consents from 1991 on ...".  The dog ate my consent forms.

Another original document is a story that appeared in Phoenix Magazine in 2008 by Jana Bommersbach, which says,

Markow maintains to this day that she had permission to test for things other than diabetes and that her “proof” is the consent forms signed by some of the Havasupai who donated blood. She insists the project had two focuses: diabetes and schizophrenia.

So in 2008, Markow was saying that schizophrenia had been a research focus of hers, and in 2013 she is saying that it wasn't?  Or more precisely, in 2013 Markow is enlisting a shill in the genetics blogosphere to deny that schizophrenia in the Havasupai had ever been a research focus of hers?

Further, the Hart Report says:

Dr. Markow was funded by NlMH and NARSAD to study the role of genetic factors in schizophrenia, a psychiatric disorder "which occurs at a significantly greater rate among the Havasupai (7%) than in any other population (1 %). Interestingly, all cases of schizophrenia occur in lineages tracing back to a single man (a shaman or medicine man) who lived in the 1880's."

NIMH is the National Institutes of Mental Health, not a cartoon.   NARSAD is the National Alliance for the Research of Schizophrenia and Depression, now called the Brain and Behavior Research Foundation.  In other words, among the original documents are funded grant proposals for research on schizophrenia.

The NARSAD grant for 1990-1991 was a big one, but unfortunately, the dog ate that, too.  According to the Hart report,

Information was hard to obtain on this grant. It is our understanding that it was funded in the amount of $92,880.00 and provided funds for the blood collection, processing and analysis that led to the genetics studies undertaken at Arizona State University (and elsewhere)....

Dr. Markow submitted the letter of intent for this grant, which requested funds to "initiate a major research program on the etiology of schizophrenia in a unique patient population in Arizona," the Havasupai. ... She proposed conducting the research in two stages. The first stage was to involve the collection of data, and it was for this stage that she was asking NARSAD, the National Alliance for Research on Schizophrenia and Depression, for funding. She indicated that support for the second, more extensive stage would be sought from NIMH, the National Institute of Mental Health. We have uncovered no evidence to establish that this letter of intent, or other documentation associated with this grant proposal, was presented to the Havasupai.

The NIMH grant was for "Genetic Analysis of the Dopamine Receptor Gene Family" and provided funding for Markow from 1992 through 1995.  The Hart report says,

the two primary goals of the project were, first, to determine the amount of genetic variation present in the dopamine receptor gene family in the Havasupai and, second, to statistically analyze the data to determine if any genetic variation was associated with the development of schizophrenia.

Unfortunately, the dog ate that grant proposal as well.  Teri Markow had a very hungry dog.

So what of this bizarre blog post by this textbook author?  The research didn't get very far, and didn't come up with anything publishable, which is why Ricki Lewis did not find any publications on it.  But how on earth can anyone claim that there was no research?  When she asks rhetorically, "Why did articles twist events to seem as if she had intended all along to study schizophrenia?" the obvious answer is that because Markow had indeed been interested in studying schizophrenia, and had received grants to do it.

So I pointed that out to Ricki Lewis, and she responded:  "just because you are funded from a certain source with a disease name in its title does not mean that you are or are intending to do research on that particular disease."   

Read that again, slowly.  A major science textbook author is telling human genetics students that they can apply for cancer funding from, say, the National Cancer Institute, and get it, while not actually having any interest in cancer or performing any research relevant to cancer.  I think she's wrong.  In fact, I think the National Cancer Institute would consider that fraudulent.

Teri Markow herself jumped in, but didn't say, "No, we did not study schizophrenia" - which was presumably the point under contention.  Instead, she said blah blah blah:

First of all, the consent forms speak for themselves with respect to the breadth of studies. However, without sufficient and appropriate genetic variants, association studies of any disease are not possible. The first step therefore, with our funding, was to seek genetic variability that could be useful in studies of disease. While we did not find sufficient variability with the techniques available at that time to perform association studies, we at least were able to provide people with feedback about their health status with respect to diabetes, because the test for this is simple. Had there been sufficient variability for stringent association studies for any disorder, we could have proceeded. 

However, even if there had been the requisite variability, stringent diagnostic testing for schizophrenia would require a major effort, including lengthy interviews, that never could have gone undetected by the participants. This fact, plus the fact that I have never published a paper on schizophrenia in the Havasupai, answer your question quite definitively.

This is from someone who received hundreds of thousands of dollars in grant money to study the genetics of schizophrenia in the Havasupai, but came up with nothing publishable.  But whether they came up with anything publishable is not the issue, this issue was whether research was carried out on the topic, without the knowledge or consent of the Havasupai.  The latter clause has not been challenged; the Havasupai were not aware that their blood was being used for any studies other than diabetes.

Those of us of a certain age can remember the "non-denial denial" from Richard Nixon's office in the old days of Watergate. 

So I tried again: "What I am hearing is that Dr. Markow sought and received funding from an agency that focuses on schizophrenia, without any intention of actually studying schizophrenia, and ultimately performing no science related to that illness."  Neither Ricki Lewis nor Teri Markow responded to that.  I suspect that if Markow publicly agreed with it, she might be incriminating herself.

Teri Markow seems to have had little difficulty in obtaining research grants or faculty positions subsequent to the Havasupai case, and now studies Drosophila.  She is probably very nice, and I've never thought that she did anything worse than what was common practice at the time.  It was the common practice that was being challenged.

One of my favorite examples of that practice is from a puff piece that Time Magazine ran on the HGDP, in which Luca Cavalli-Sforza was trying to show himself off as a swashbuckler.  And as S. J. Perelman once said, no man ever buckled a better swash.

On one occasion, when Cavalli-Sforza was taking blood from schoolchildren in a rural region of the Central African Republic, he was confronted by an angry farmer brandishing an ax.  Recalls the scientist, “I remember him saying, ‘If you take the blood of the children, I’ll take yours.’ He was worried that we might want to do some magic with the blood."  (Time Magazine, 16 January 1995)

When people come after you with an ax, that is usually a clue that you have not received their voluntary informed consent.  That is why there is no HGDP anymore, and why Teri Markow now works on flies.

Bioethics serves to make scientists responsible social actors, especially if they don't want to be responsible social actors.  Time was, that a scientist could do anything they wanted to anyone they wanted, for any reason they wanted.  Now they can't.  The lesson we learned around the middle of the last century is that the progress of science is great, but when it bumps up against human rights, human rights wins, hands down.  That's a good lesson for genetics students to learn. 

And what is the author/blogger Ricki Lewis's stake in all this?  Why bother to revisit a dead issue, and mount such a preposterous defense of Markow's work?  Maybe she's one of those people still fighting the Science Wars, who thinks that bioethics is just a set of obstacles to scientific research.  She does seem to hold some unusual views about science: "Science has nothing to do with belief, it is about data and evidence."  Actually, science has a lot to do with belief; for example, if you believe that you can do science on people without their consent, then you don't get to do the science.